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Abstract 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is a viral disease that affects the digestive, nervous 
and respiratory systems of all domestic and wild birds with high morbidity and mortality. It is 
highly contagious disease which can be fatal in humans. The avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are 
classified as types A, B and C with 15 subtypes of the type A. To date, all disease causing HPAI 
Viruses belong to H5 or H7 subtypes; and affect pigs and humans with the pigs serving as a 
mixing vehicle for re-assortment of the virus. The domestic ducks get infected without showing 
clinical signs and serve as a source of infection for domestic poultry.  
Outbreaks of HPAl in Europe, Asia and Turkey are reported to be associated, with the presence 
of wet lands and lakes where migratory birds rest. In some African countries like Nigeria, such 
wet lands exist with free flying wild birds and domestic ducks visiting and resting. The 
possible source of introduction into a country could be through importation or smuggling of 
infected poultry products across the borders and through migratory birds that fly through 
identified pathways. The status of HPAl in many African countries including Nigeria is still 
under investigation so that appropriate strategies / measures to prevent introduction of the 
disease into the country can be implemented and / or strengthened through restriction of 
importation of poultry and poultry products from high risk countries, effective disease 
surveillance, functional National Veterinary services, quarantine and community based 
participatory epidemiological system for HPAI surveillance and control. 
This article reviewed the global epidemiology and risk factors of HPAI infection in Nigeria and 
other African countries with emphasis on specific preventive measures that can reduce 
introduction of the virus into the country and the epidemiological surveillance for case 
detection / identification, screening and management. This review provides useful information 
and updates for health workers in tropical countries on the trends of AIVs and HPAI, 
diagnostic criteria using case definitions for both community and health facility levels and 




Avian influenza, or “bird flu”, is a 
contagious disease of animals caused by 
viruses that normally infect only birds 
and, less commonly, pigs. Avian 
influenza viruses (AIVs) are highly 
species-specific, but have, on rare 
occasions, crossed the species barrier to 
infect humans. In domestic poultry, 
infection with avian influenza viruses 
causes two main 
forms of disease, distinguished by low 
and high extremes of virulence. The so-                  
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called “low pathogenic” form   
commonly causes only mild symptoms 
(ruffled feathers, a drop in egg 
production) and may easily go 
undetected. The highly pathogenic form 
is far more dramatic. It spreads very 
rapidly through poultry flocks, causes 
disease affecting multiple internal 
organs, and has a mortality that can 
approach 100%, often within 48  
hours (1,2). The role of migratory birds 
in the spread of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza is not fully understood. Wild 
waterfowl are considered the natural 
reservoir of all influenza A viruses. 
They have probably carried influenza 
viruses, with no apparent harm, for 
centuries. They are known to carry 
viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes, but 
usually in the low pathogenic form. 
Considerable circumstantial evidence 
suggests that migratory birds can 
introduce low pathogenic H5 and H7 
viruses to poultry flocks, which then 
mutate to the highly pathogenic form. 
In the past, highly pathogenic viruses 
have been isolated from migratory birds 
on very rare occasions involving a few 
birds, usually found dead within the 
flight range of a poultry outbreak. This 
finding long suggested that wild 
waterfowl are not agents for the onward 
transmission of these viruses (2,3). 
Direct or indirect contact between 
domestic flocks and wild migratory 
waterfowl has been implicated as a 
frequent cause of epidemics in poultry 
populations. It is generally accepted 
that migratory waterfowl, most notably 
wild ducks, are the natural reservoir of 
AI viruses, which can be transmitted to 
domestic bird populations and to 
commercial poultry (2,4).  
 
Avian Influenza Viruses 
Avian influenza virus (AIV) is a 
member of the family Orthomyxoviridae 
and genus influenza A. The influenza 
viruses that constitute this family are 
classified into type A, B, or C based on 
the differences between their 
nucleoprotein and matrix protein 
Antigens. AIVs belong to type A, which 
are further categorized into subtypes 
according to the Antigens of the 
haemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase 
(N) projections on their surfaces. There 
are 16 haemagglutinin subtypes and 9 
Neuraminidase subtypes. Only viruses 
of the H5 and H7 subtypes are known 
to cause the highly pathogenic form of 
the disease. However, not all viruses of 
the H5 and H7 subtypes are highly 
pathogenic and not all will cause severe 
disease in poultry. On present 
understanding, H5 and H7 viruses are 
introduced to poultry flocks in their low 
pathogenic form. When allowed to 
circulate in poultry populations, the 
viruses can mutate, usually within a  
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few months, into the highly pathogenic 
form. This is why the presence of an H5 
or H7 virus in poultry is always cause 
for concern, even when the initial signs 
of infection are mild (2,3, 5,6). 
AIVs are susceptible to warm 
environmental condition, short term 
exposure to ultraviolet radiation and 
desiccation. Common detergents and 
disinfectants such as calcium & sodium 
hypochloride and Virlcox can readily 
inactivate it. However the virus can 
survives for 35-44 days in faeces at 4oC 
but for 4days at 25oC. Within poultry 
farms the virus can survive for up to 35 
days. AIVs can be isolated from Lake 
Water where they can persist and retain 
infectivity for more than 30 days at 0 oC 
and for only 4days at 22 oC (7,8). AIVs 
are shed in faeces and respiratory tract 
of infected birds for at least 14 days and 
can be recovered from refrigerated 
carcasses for 23 days. Birds processed 
during the viraemic stage can 
contaminate other carcasses with blood 
and faeces containing the virus. Eggs 
laid in the early stage of AI infection 
could contain the virus on the egg yolk, 
albumen and the eggshell. The virus can 
also penetrate cracked or even intact 
eggshells (1,2,8). 
HPAI Virus is present in all secretions 
and excretions of infected birds. 
Transmission may be direct inhalation 
of contaminated aerosol, dust as 
droplets and droplets nuclei or 
indirectly via primarily attributed to 
movement of ingestion of contaminated 
water, feeds or infected carcasses. 
Transmission of HPAI between flocks is 
infected birds and action of humans 
through movement of feeds/personal 
equipment and vehicles into or out of 
contaminated premises. Spread of the 
disease into counties could be through 
importation or smuggling of infected 
poultry and poultry products across the 
border and through migratory birds (9). 
The virus is infective for almost all 
commercial, domestic and wild avian 
species. Chickens and turkeys are 
highly susceptible. Ducks and geese 
though susceptible to infection with all 
AIV strains but suffer clinical disease 
from only virulent strain. Other birds 
are susceptible at varying degree, while 
Pigs and humans are equally 
susceptible to infection by the HPAI 
virus (1,2,10).  
Prevalence and distribution of AIV 
AI is an infectious disease of birds 
caused by type A strains of the 
influenza virus. The disease, which was 
first identified in Italy more than 100 
years ago, occurs worldwide. In the 
history of man, it is responsible for the 
largest pandemics of the last century 
especially “Spanish flu” pandemic of 
1918-1919 which claimed over 40 
million lives (1,10,11). From 1998 to  
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2002 avian flu pandemic with onset in 
China has spread round the world 
resulting in avoidable human death and 
over 20million chicken culled world-
wide (1,10,11). The current outbreak of 
highly pathogenic AI A(H5N1), which 
began in Southeast Asia in mid-2003, is 
the largest and most severe affecting 
many countries simultaneously. Despite 
the death and destruction of over 150 
million birds, the virus is now 
considered endemic in many parts of 
Indonesia and Viet Nam and in some 
parts of Cambodia, China and Thailand 
(10–12) . The risk of a pandemic will 
persist until the disease is controlled in 
birds, which may take several years.  
The first human cases of AI A (H5N1) 
associated with the current outbreak in 
birds were confirmed in January 2004 in 
two children and one adult admitted 
into hospital in Hanoi with severe 
respiratory illness who tested positive 
for this strain. Since then, additional 
human cases have occurred in several 
countries, and the clinical spectrum of 
AI A (H5N1) infection in humans 
ranges from asymptomatic infection to 
severe disseminated disease (2,3,12). In 
the African Region, little is known 
about the burden of avian influenza 
because few countries have laboratory 
capacity for virus isolation. No 
documented H5N1 infection has been 
reported in the region. However, an 
outbreak of H5N2 influenza was 
reported among ostriches in South 
Africa in 2004 and in December 2005 in 
Zimbabwe (13). In order to address the 
threat of a pandemic of influenza, in 
African region, WHO have tried to 
improve and strengthen laboratory 
capacities of African counties for 
influenza and promoting the 
framework of Integrated Disease 
Surveillance and Response (IDSR) 
strategy (13). 
There is increasing concern that Africa 
is at great risk of pandemic influenza. 
Firstly, as winter sets in Northern 
hemisphere, migratory birds can bring 
the deadly virus to Africa. Secondly, 
with increasing global travel there is a 
high risk of dissemination of the H5N1 
virus. Thirdly, the poor health 
infrastructure in Africa and the non-
availability of vaccines or drugs means 
that millions of people would be at high 
risk of pandemic influenza (1– 4). 
In January 2006 AI infection was 
reported in Sambawa poultry Farm in 
Kaduna state of Nigeria and this was 
confirmed on 7th February 2006 by 
international office of Epizootic (IOE) 
reference Lab in Padova, Italy (9). Since 
then several focal outbreaks in poultry 
farms have been recorded in 13 
Northern states of Nigeria including 
Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory 
(FCT). More than 2 million chickens 
were culled, poultry farms closed down  
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and huge some of money paid as 
compensation to poultry farmers (9). 
Although, only Four (4) human 
morbidity cases and one death were 
recorded in the country (9). This figure 
probably represents a tip of ice berg 
because of the prevailing poor reporting 
and incomplete data that characterized 
the disease surveillance and notification 
system in Nigeria and indeed other 
developing African countries.   
Risk factors for AI infection 
Since 1878 when HPAI was first 
reported in Italy, the infection had 
spread across all international 
boundaries due to increase international 
travels, migratory birds, poultry and 
products exports, hence assuming a 
rapid pandemic trend in the last decade 
with pockets of epidemics world over.  
AIVs are probably ubiquitous in wild 
water birds. Pathogenic strains could 
emerge and cause disease in domestic 
poultry in any country at any time 
without warning.  The occurrence of 
human cases creates enormous 
challenges to the health systems. 
Laboratory confirmation and 
management of human H5N1 viral 
infections is technically challenging, 
expensive, and demanding on human 
and financial resources. The major risk 
factors for AI infection and outbreak of 
HPAI in developing countries can be 
grouped into 2:  
i. Risk of introduction of AIVs 
through migratory birds:  Nigeria 
lies in the East Africa/West Asian 
and the North Atlantic flyways of 
the migrating birds, and hence is 
at risk of the introduction of the 
virus. Also, increasing trade and 
human traffic between Nigeria 
and other countries in South East 
Africa and South Africa is another 
major threat to having the 
infection (9). Expansion of 
infection zone of Avian influenza 
due to globalization and relative 
ease of movement and 
transportation through porous 
borders that encourage informal 
livestock movement, Smuggling / 
illegal movement of poultry and 
products from infected countries 
coupled with inadequate 
veterinary quarantine facilities 
and manpower are the major risk 
factors for introduction of AIV 
into other countries especially 
those within the flyways of these 
migratory birds. 
ii. Risk of sustenance and 
maintenance of HPAI in African 
countries: Risk factors under this 
category are associated with 
poverty, ignorance and socio-
cultural believes and practices 
relating to keeping of pets and 
domestic animals for economic  
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and spiritual purposes. Also, lack 
or poor implementation of 
veterinary policies and inefficient 
public veterinary services are 
other issues that may encourage 
sustenance of the virus. Some of 
the specific factors that arise from 
above issues are (1, 9):  
• Backyard poultry, peri-
urban and urban 
commercial poultry 
production with little or no 
bio-security and constant 
introduction of new birds 
from relatively unknown 
and unverified sources. 
• Uncontrolled livestock and 
poultry movement within 
and outside the country 
due to lack of enforcement 
of animal disease control 
laws and regulation, 
including registration and 
Licensing of poultry farms 
& hatcheries  
• Increased close contact 
between poultry and 
human, and lack of 
organized poultry 
marketing which encourage 
open live poultry markets 
characterized by 
interspecies mixing and 
poor sanitary condition. 
• Inadequate experience of 
most vet and health 
workers in the recognition 
& diagnosing of HPAI. 
• Inadequate / lack of 
funding for veterinary 
services, compensation of 
Livestock/ flocks owners in 
the events of mass culling 
of birds and poor disposal 
facilities for culled or dead 
birds thus encouraging sale 
and consumption of sick 
and dead birds 
Threats and Consequences of HPAI 
AIVs do not infect humans because of 
host barriers to infection, such as cell 
receptor specificities.  However, they 
can occasionally cross the species 
barrier and directly infect humans, 
including highly pathogenic strains that 
have caused fatal disease in 
humans.(1,2) In 1997, AI A(H5N1) 
caused an outbreak in domestic poultry 
in Hong Kong and also infected 18 
people and causing 6 deaths (11,14).  
Since then, other AI outbreaks have 
resulted in human infections. The 
outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 
avian influenza in poultry which began 
in Asia in mid-2003 have led to over 120 
confirmed human cases of which more 
than half have died (1,2). The majority  
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of cases occurred in previously healthy 
children and young adults. Historically, 
the number of deaths during a 
pandemic has varied greatly. Death 
rates are largely determined by four 
factors: the number of people who 
become infected, the virulence of the 
virus, the underlying characteristics and 
vulnerability of affected populations, 
and the effectiveness of preventive 
measures. 
Presently, avian influenza A (H5N1) is 
endemic in birds in many parts of the 
world.  The widespread persistence of 
H5N1 in bird populations poses two 
main risks to human health.  The first is 
the risk of infection when the virus 
spreads directly from birds to humans. 
The second risk, which is of even 
greater concern, is that there will be 
increased possibilities for the widely 
circulating virus to infect humans and 
possibly re-assort into a strain that is 
both highly infectious for humans and 
spreads easily from human-to-human. 
Such a change could mark the start of a 
pandemic (15). 
One important feature of AIV is the 
tendency to acquire new properties 
through adaptation, mutation and 
recombination that may lead to 
emergence of a highly virulent virus 
with many serotypes. The fear is that in 
nearest future a more highly virulent 
virus with high possibility of man to 
man transmission could be produced if 
the spread of HPAI is not curtailed. The 
implication of the pandemic nature is 
such that stringent international and 
National regulations on Quarantine and 
veterinary Laws have to be put in place 
which may affect human movements, 
poultry and diary products exports. 
This will invariably affects tourism, 
international trade and the world 
economy. For example, over 2million 
chicken were culled and about 160,000 
US dollars paid as compensation to 
poultry farmers following January / 
February 2006 outbreaks of AI in 
Nigeria. These outbreaks also caused 
loss of jobs due to closure of poultry 
farms (9). At the global level, it is 
estimated that 20million chicken were 
culled causing the world over 2Billion 
USD loss (1,2). This huge amount of 
resources could have been used for 
other health conditions.  
Nigeria has an estimated poultry 
productions of around 140million birds 
largely concentrated in the South- 
western part of the country and 60% of 
these poultry production takes place in 
small backyard flocks, making families, 
associates and visitors at risk (9). Large 
scale commercial farming of poultry 
occurs mainly in the Northern States 
where outbreak had been confirmed. 
Rapid spread of the virus within 
Nigeria has raised concern over possible 
spread to neighboring countries in the  
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sub-region because of porous borders 
and restriction of movement of people 
and poultry are difficult to enforce, thus 
putting the neighboring countries at 
risk. 
Another implication of HPAI outbreaks 
and pandemic is that Medical supplies 
will be inadequate. Vaccines and 
antiviral drugs (the two most important 
medical interventions for reducing 
illness and deaths during a pandemic) 
will be inadequate in all countries at the 
start of a pandemic and for many 
months thereafter. Inadequate supplies 
of vaccines are of particular concern, as 
vaccines are considered the first line of 
defense for protecting populations. On 
present trends, many developing 
countries will have no access to vaccines 
throughout the duration of a pandemic; 
and because of this, large numbers of 
deaths will occur (1, 2). Economic and 
social activities will be disrupted due to 
High rates of illness and worker 
absenteeism and schools may be shot 
down. Social and economic disruptions 
would be worse if workers absenteeism 
involve people in essential services, 
such as power, transportation, health 
and communications. 
Prevention and Control 
AIV usually spreads when live birds 
carrying infection are bought and sold, 
and by contact of birds with bird 
droppings on dirty equipment, cages, 
feed, vehicles or shoes/clothing (9,16). 
Good hygienic practices (bio-security) is 
therefore an extremely important safety 
measure to prevent infection entering 
domesticated poultry; and all persons 
keeping or working with poultry 
should play their role in this. Therefore, 
promoting and encouraging good 
health habit would go along way in 
curtailing the spread of the virus in 
human population. Health education 
and awareness campaign to the public, 
poultry workers, diary products 
handlers, families with backyard 
poultry will go a long way to prevent 
spread of the virus. Specific preventive 
measures are: 
a. Prevention of introduction of HPAI 
into the country 
This can be achieved by adopting WHO 
recommended standard measures and 
strategies which include (6,16,17):  
• Ban on importation of 
poultry and poultry 
products from 
countries where the 
disease is known to 
exist especially from 
the Asian continent 
• Adopting effective 
animal disease 
surveillance involving  
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• high-risk areas such as 
poultry markets, wet 
lands and poultry 
located along known 
migratory birds routes, 
poultry abattoirs, 
borders and targeted 
farms should be carried 
out. 











post and enhancing 
manpower capabilities. 
• Targeted community 
based training of rural 
backyard poultry 
farmers in various 
aspects of HPAI 
recognition and control 
including bio-security 
procedures applicable 
to rural small-scale 
poultry enterprises and 
the role of animal 
disease vigilante in the 
control of HPAI. 
• Introduction and 
enforcement of 
regulatory policies and 
requirements for 
import permits for 
poultry and poultry 
products by the Federal 
authorities or agency 
concern with live stock 
services. 
• Development of a 
traceable mechanism 
for animal and strict 
monitoring of 
movement of poultry 
and poultry products 
through registration 
and Licensing of 
poultry farms, 
hatcheries and other 
poultry enterprises. 
• Development of a 
community based, 
participatory rural 
livestock and poultry 
disease surveillance 
system and integrating 
it into the existing 
epidemiological 
surveillance network. 
• Training of 
veterinarian, 
auxiliaries, others  
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• ategories of poultry 
farmers on HPAI 
prevention and control 
strategies including 
aspect of bio-security 
and early recognition / 
detection of the disease. 
• Effective public 
enlightenment and 
awareness programmes 
on HPAI policy and 
preventive services 
available to the public            
b.  Specific control measures in Birds 
and man 
Preventive strategies and 
activities under this category 




• Proper care of poultry 
farm that include 
nutrition, vaccination, 
isolation of infected 
birds, mass destruction 
of infected birds and 
disinfection poultry 
farms. Control of the 
disease in birds by 
early diagnosis & 
treatment 
• Proper regulation and 
inspection of poultry 




proper meat and 
chicken inspection, 
farm inspection, 
thorough cooking of 
meat and chicken. 
Avian flu does not 
survive high 
temperature. 
• Prompt response to 
disease outbreak in 
birds’ population e.g. 
Proper notification, 
isolation and veterinary 
surveillance. 
• Observing universal 
precautions and 
passionate personal 
hygiene among poultry 
workers before and 
after handling poultry 
birds and poultry 
products. Provision and 
use of personal 
protective measures 
(like apron, coats, 
gloves, boots, goggles 
and masks etc) for high 
risk groups like poultry 
workers, vet officers. 
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• Immunization against 
HPAI among people at 
high risk, e.g. 
veterinary officers, 
poultry farmers & 
workers, Diary 
handlers etc. 
• Avoidance of 
unnecessary contact 
and proximity to 
poultry area especially 
among backyard 
poultry, free ranging 
flock and birds aspects.    
c. Early Diagnosis & Screening 
Diagnosis involves clinical signs and 
symptoms with confirmatory 
Laboratory tests which include: virus 
isolation and gene sequence detection at 
the National veterinary laboratory 
(where available) and further 
characterization of isolates like 
heamoglutinin and neuraminidase 
typing could be done at national Lab 
and other regional and world reference 
laboratories. The WHO recommended 
standard procedures for the screening 
and diagnosis of suspected human 
influenza A H5NI cases are: (9, 16, 18- 
20) 
1.  Surveillance case definition for 
community and Health workers 
Community base alert 
definition consists of fever, 
cough and history of contact 
with sick /dead birds or history 
of contact with another person 
with similar complaints. 
Members of the community are 
expected to report and/ or send 
a. Rapid antigen detection using 
any of the following tests:  
Immuno-fluorescence assay 
which is a widely used, 
sensitive method for diagnosis 
of influenza A and B virus 
infections and five other 
clinically important respiratory 
viruses; and Enzyme 
immunoassay for influenza A 
nucleoprotein (NP). The results 
of these tests can be obtained 
within 30 minutes. 
b. Virus culture provides results 
in 2–10 days. Both shell-vial and 
standard cell-culture methods 
may be used to detect clinically 
important respiratory viruses. 
Positive influenza cultures may 
or may not exhibit cytopathic 
effects but virus identification 
by immuno-fluorescence of cell 
cultures or haemaglutination-
inhibition (HI) assay of cell 
culture medium (supernatant) 
is required. 
c. Polymerase chain reaction  
109 
 
(PCR) and Real-time assays. 
Primer sets specific for the 
haemaglutinin (HA) gene of 
currently circulating influenza 
A/H1, A/H3 and B viruses are 
becoming more widely used. 
Results can be available within 
a few hours from either clinical 
swabs or infected cell cultures.  
Samples required for birds are tracheal 
ad cloacae swabs, faecal samples, and 
paired sera from live birds. Intestinal 
contents, samples of trachea, lungs, air 
sacs, spleen, kidneys, brain, liver, 
pancreas and heart can also be used. 
Laboratory diagnosis for birds includes 
antigen detection through Immuno-
flourescence and Direct antigen Flu A 
tests (Directigen TM fluA test). This is 
followed by Virus Isolation and 
identification using Reverse 
transcriptase polymerase chain reaction 
(PT – PCR), Virus characterization 
through Haemaglutinin typing, 
neuraminidase typing, gene sequence 
detection and Serological diagnosis 
using Haemaglutination Inhibition test 
(HIT), Agar Gel Immuno-diffusion test 
(AGID), Competitive Enzyme linked 
Immunosorbent Assay (C-ELISA). 
Infected animals could be differentiated 
from vaccinated by serological test 
called Differentiating Infected from 
Vaccinated Animal System 
(DIVA).cases meeting this definition to 
nearest health facility. Health care 
workers must be at alert to suspect 
cases of avian flu by using health 
facility based case definition which is 
(9):   
• Fever > 38oc with History of 
exposure in last 7 days before 
onset of illness and one or more 
of the following symptoms / 
signs: Cough, sore throat, 
Breathing difficulties. 
• Any person requiring 
hospitalization for an influenza-
like illness and living in, or 
coming from an area with avian 
influenza outbreak..  
• Any person having died of an 
unexplained respiratory illness. 
2.  Notification of suspected cases 
Any case that meets the suspected case 
definition should be immediately 
notified to the Disease Surveillance and 
Notification Officer (DSNO) at the 
district, regional or national health 
office using duly completed Immediate 
case based reporting form (IDSR 001) 
and must be sent by the fastest means 
(e.g. fax, email, radio, telephone etc). 
Following this reporting, a Rapid 
Response team would be dispatched to 
conduct detailed investigation and re-
assessment of the suspected cases and 
fresh specimen collected. The team also 
arrange for the transfer of patient to  
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avian influenza treatment centre (if  
vailable) using dedicated vehicle; and 
help the local / district health unit / 
facility or department in producing plan 
to identify and follow up close contacts. 
3. Laboratory diagnosis of AI and 
HPAI infection in birds and man 
Laboratory identification of human 
influenza A virus infections is 
commonly carried out by direct antigen 
detection, isolation in cell culture, or 
detection of influenza-specific RNA by 
reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain 
reaction. The optimal specimen for 
influenza A virus detection is a 
nasopharyngeal aspirate obtained 
within 3 days of the onset of symptoms. 
Nasopharyngeal swabs and other 
specimens including serum can also be 
used. Assays available for the diagnosis 
of influenza A virus infections include 
(18–22): 
d. Case management   
Case management at the 
hospitals (or avian influenza 
treatment centre) includes 
patient isolation, barrier 
nursing and maintenance of 
precautionary measures. The 
patients and family must be 
educated on the risk of 
transmission and the need to 
notify health Authorities of 
other suspected cases. 
Standard precautions should 
be used for all patients 
receiving care in hospitals, 
regardless of their diagnosis 
or presumed infection status. 
Some of the precautionary 
measures include (19, 23–25): 
i) Hand washing with either a 
plain or antimicrobial soap and 
water to prevent possible self-
inoculation of the nose, mouth, 
and conjunctivae and the 
transfer of micro-organisms to 
the environment or other 
patients by contaminated 
hands.  The use of an alcohol-
based hand rub for routine 
hand antisepsis is 
recommended. Many studies 
have demonstrated that 
influenza, an enveloped virus, 
is susceptible to alcohols when 
tested in vitro and in vivo 
testing with a 95% ethyl 
alcohol.  
ii) Use of gloves when touching 
mucous membranes and non-
intact skin, blood, body fluids, 
secretions, excretions, and 
contaminated items. Change 
gloves between tasks and 
procedures on the same patient 
after contact with material that 




organisms. Remove gloves 
promptly after use and wash 
hands immediately to avoid 
transfer of micro-organisms to 
other patients or environments.   
iii) Wear mask and eye 
protection or a face shield to 
protect mucous membranes of 
the eyes, nose, and mouth 
during procedures and patient-
care activities that are likely to 
generate splashes or sprays of 
blood, body fluids, secretions, 
and excretions.  
iv) Wearing of gown: a clean, 
non-sterile gown is required to 
protect skin and prevent soiling 
of clothing during procedures, 
patients’ care and other 
activities that are likely to 
generate splashes or sprays of 
blood, body fluids, secretions, 
or excretions. Soiled gown 
should be removed as promptly 
as possible and wash hands to 
avoid transfer of 
microorganisms to other 
patients or environments. 
e.  Drug treatment and use of 
vaccine 
Two drugs (in the 
neuraminidase inhibitors class), 
oseltamivir (commercially 
known as Tamiflu) and 
zanamivir (commercially 
known as Relenza) are 
available; and both can reduce 
the severity and duration of 
illness caused by seasonal 
influenza. The choice of drug 
may depend on its availability 
and cost. The efficacy of the 
neuraminidase inhibitors 
depends on their 
administration within 48 hours 
of onset of symptom (26). For 
cases of human infection with 
H5N1, the drugs may improve 
prospects of survival, if 
administered early, but clinical 
data are limited. The dosage 
treatment with a neuraminidase 
inhibitor such as oseltamivir is 
75 mg orally, twice daily for 5 
days. Reference must be made 
to manufacturer’s instruction 
for children dosage (9,16). 
Supportive cares with oygen, 
antibiotics and antipyretics may 
be required. Administration of 
salicylates (such as aspirin) in 
children less than 18 years of 
age must be avoided because of 
the risk of Reye syndrome, 
rather paracetamol or ibuprofen 
can be used (9,16, 26). 
Vaccines effective against a 
pandemic virus are not yet  
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available. Vaccines are produced each 
year for seasonal influenza but will not 
protect against pandemic influenza. 
Although, vaccine against the H5N1 
virus is under development in several 
developed countries, none is ready for 
commercial production. Some clinical 
trials are now under way to test 
whether experimental vaccines will be 
fully protective and to determine 
whether different formulations can 
economize on the amount of antigen 
required, thus boosting production 
capacity (16,27). 
f. Discharge policy 
Studies are ongoing for better 
understanding of viral excretion 
patterns in humans infected 
with the influenza A(H5N1) 
viruses. However, WHO 
recommends that adult patients 
remain in hospital ( if admitted) 
or confined to a location ( un-
hospitalised) for 7 days after 
resolution of fever. Previous 
human influenza studies have 
indicated that children younger 
than 12 years can shed virus for 
21 days after onset of illness 
(5,27). Therefore, infection 
control measures for children 
should ideally remain in place 
for this period. Where this is 
not feasible the family should 
be educated on personal 
hygiene and infection control 
measures; and the affected child 
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